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1 A History of the MDGs in Bolivia
After a long and tough experiences under military dictatorship that started in 1964 and 
was supported by the US and other Western governments, Bolivian society returned to 
democracy in 1982. The ensuing rapid expansion of state capitalism mainly benefi ted 
the strongly unionized sectors of miners and urban-based factory workers – but it 
also led to unprecedented hyperinfl ation in 1986. After that, Bolivia entered into two 
decades of neoliberal structural adjustment promoted by the World Bank, the IMF 
and the international donor community. A set of policies were successfully applied 
based on delocalizing workers formerly contracted by state-owned companies in the 
mining sector, the aggressive privatization of state-owned assets, a reduction in pub-
lic administration, and delegating the planning and implementation of development 
projects to local networks of municipalities and NGOs. However, as shown through a 
great deal of research carried out by Kohl (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004), such economic 
restructuring and privatization led to a decline in government revenues and a persis-
tent economic and political crisis, while also giving transnational fi rms access to the 
abundant nationwide oil, gas, mineral and timber reserves and enhancing the power of 
local elites who had “responsibility” for helping to administer the increasing fl ow of 
funds to the municipalities.
When the UN approved the MDGs in 2000, the legitimacy of the neoliberal model 
followed since 1986 had almost evaporated. Occasional revolts by shifting alliances 
of people living in rural and urban areas had challenged the Bolivian societal system 
several times. The revolt against the imposed privatization of drinking water led to the 
“water war” of Cochabamba, which gained worldwide fame in 2000 (Assies 2003). In 
this situation, it is not surprising that the neoliberal government’s attempt to regain its 
claims to “social responsibility” by strongly committing itself to the MDGs has not 
really struck a chord in society as a whole. The debate about MDGs therefore never 
spread beyond the circles of experts from international organizations and some Boliv-
ian government offi cials. The idea of the MDGs virtually perished in the upheavals 
caused by permanent social and political protest demanding radical change to the neo-
liberal system as part of broad-based political renewal.
At the same times as this “successful” implementation of neoliberal policies, it was 
mainly indigenous people – who make up about 64% of the population – started to 
reorganize themselves outside the classical system of representative democracy, which 
was almost completely dominated by white and mestizo elites; they developed in-
digenous and popular social movements with the aim of bring about a new “social 
contract” through their demands for a new Bolivian constitution. Their main tactics 
were direct political action, with marches, protests, road blocks, hunger strikes and 
huge mass mobilizations, which fi nally led to the democratic “system change” in 2005. 
The latter was enshrined in a radical new political constitution based on the concept 
of a plurinational state that stipulates recognition and autonomy for the 36 indigenous 
nations in Bolivia within the territorial context of the present state, and is based on co-
existence and co-governance by indigenous nations and the structures of the existing 
state. The main goal was to create a better link between the demands of indigenous 
The MDGs in Bolivia: Poverty Reduction in a Post-neoliberal AreaNorth-South
dialogue
8
social movements that developed over the past two decades and the new constitutional 
texts that explore alternative forms of citizenship and democracy espoused by indig-
enous social movement groups (Lupien 2011).
In the light of this wider panorama, the following section traces how the MDGs were 
emerging in Bolivia and how their political meaning has developed.
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2  The Situation of the MDGs
in 2009
The sixth progress report on the MDGs presented by the government of Bolivia in 
2010 continues to monitor progress and is structured in the same way as previous re-
ports. Table 1 gives an overview of the situation in 2009 and outlook by 2015. One ma-
jor result consists in providing evidence that the new policies and structural changes 
are continuing to reduce extreme and moderate poverty. Additionally, the projections 
presented for 2015 give reasonable evidence that suggests that if poverty reduction 
continues at the present pace the goal of reducing extreme and moderate poverty will 
be more than achieved. In contrast to previous reports, there is, for the fi rst time, an 
inversion of trends. While the general reduction in poverty rates was mainly due to 
people living in urban areas, the situation has now turned around. Over the 2007-2009 
period, the reduction in extreme poverty is almost twice as high (15.8%) as in urban 
areas (8.9%) (cf. Ministerio de Planifi cación del Desarrollo del Estado Plurinacional 
de Bolivia 2010).
Table 1:  Summary of situation regarding MDGs in 2009 and outlook by 2015. (Ministerio de Planifi -
cación del Desarrollo del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia 2010)
MDG Goal 1: Erradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target
 
Indicators
Base 
line
Cur-
rent 
rate
MDGs 
2015
Gap 
2015*
1A: Halve, between 
1990 and 2015, the 
proportion 
of people whose 
income is less 
than $1 a day
1.
Proportion of people 
living in extreme poverty
41.2 26.1 24.1 -2
(1996) (2009p)    
2.
 
Poverty gap ratio
22.5 12.8 - -
(1996) (2009p)    
3.
 
Participation of the poorest 20% 
in national income
1.5 2.6 - -
(1996) (2009p)    
4.
 
Proportion of people l
iving in moderate poverty
64.8 50.6 - -
(1996) (2009p)    
1B: Achieve full and 
productive employ-
ment and decent 
work for all, includ-
ing women 
and young people
1.
 
GDP growth rate by person 
employed
1.9 0.8 - -
(1996) (2009p)    
2.
 
Employment to population ratio 
(percentage)
66.5 63.0 - -
(1996) (2009p)    
3.
 
Proportion of employed people 
living in extreme poverty
42.0 24.2 - -
(1996) (2009p)    
4.
 
Proportion of own-account and 
contributing family workers in 
total employment
66.1 55.4 - -
(1996) (2009p)    
1C: Halve, between 
1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people 
who suffer from 
hunger
1.
 
Proportion of children 
under age three with chronic 
malnutrition
37.7 20.3 19.0 -1.3
(1989) (2008)    
2.
 
Proportion of children under age 
fi ve who are underweight
13.2 6.1 6.6 0.5
(1989) (2008)    
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There have also been signifi cant changes regarding the poverty of indigenous and non-
indigenous people., The reduction of extreme poverty between 2006 and 2009 of the 
“lagging behind” group of indigenous people was more than twice as high (14.6%) as 
for non-indigenous people (5.8%).
In addition to previous reports, and recognizing that beyond the reduction of poverty 
the distribution of wealth within the whole society is another important indicator, the 
2010 report includes disaggregated data on the evolution of the GINI Index in rural 
and urban areas.
 The Importance of the MDGs  in Bolivia
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3  The Importance of the MDGs 
in Bolivia
In this chapter we present an overview of the changing importance of the MDGs since 
implementation started in 2000. In the specifi c context of Bolivia, the comparison 
before and after Evo Morales’ government radical changes started in 2005 seems to 
be particularly relevant. Such analysis is not only advisable because 2005 was a year 
of signifi cant change in Bolivian history, but also because it represents a situation 
that allows us to explore the possibilities and constraints of a fairly radical shift from 
a neoliberal (Bolivia was considered for a long time as a “model pupil” of neoliberal 
policymaking; Molenaers and Renard 2003) to a new pattern of social contract. The 
specifi c feature of this shift is that the state is at the same time aligning itself far more 
closely to social, indigenous and political movements that are clearly distinct from the 
classical political parties, and aims to play a pro-active role in shaping society that 
explicitly includes shaping relationships within the national and global economy.
3.1 Neoliberal period
Bolivia became a kind of “model pupil” of the “new way” of approaching devel-
opment, displaying an excellent “track record” approved of by the World Bank and 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which allowed the country to generate 
overall growth and stabilize the political dynamics. However, income poverty was 
persisting at (too) high levels, although public spending increased from 12% to 16% 
of GDP between 1995 and 1999 (Komives et al. 2003).
As a consequence social unrest increased and began to target neoliberal policies not as 
the solution (as promoted by the governments) but as the problem., The former military 
dictator Hugo Banzer was elected in 1997 with the backing of a mega-coalition of a 
broad range of increasingly illegitimate “traditional” parties. He was a confessed neo-
liberalism. In order to cope with the growing social and political unrest promoted by 
the strengthening of political and indigenous movements operating beyond the control 
of the established parties, the Banzer government decided in 1997 to organize a “Na-
tional Dialogue”. This initiative was closely coordinated with the HIPC I promoted by 
IMF and WB.1 The political objective was to weaken extra-parliamentary opposition by 
establishing a link between government, parties and social and indigenous movements 
that aimed to defi ne a joint political agenda. The process started with a fi rst round of 
consultation with the newly strengthened and democratized local municipal government 
structures. These were the result of a pretty successful decentralization policy based on 
a combination of transferring funds and responsibilities from the central state and a for-
mal recognition of civil society’s political organizations embraced by the municipalities. 
Reducing poverty by increasing the share of public investment through the municipali-
ties was an important point on the agenda. The agenda emerging from this fi rst round of 
1  The  Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) is a group of 39 developing countries with high levels of poverty and debt 
overhang which are eligible for special assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
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consultation at the municipal level (perceived by many as successful) should have been 
further reinforced at departmental and national level. However, since these subsequent 
steps never happened, the “National Dialogue”, instead of establishing links between the 
white and mestizo elite of the country (running the government and the formal sector of 
private economy) and the large majority of mainly indigenous and poor people, further 
delegitimized the government as along with the policy model they were following (Mc-
Neish 2006). 
Linking the HIPIC initiative with the implementation of the MDGs, Bolivia’s govern-
ment was one of the fi rst countries to start work on a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) as suggested by the convention about the Millennium Development Goals’ 
framework. A small team of economic technocrats outlined the cornerstones of the 
PRSP in close collaboration with the World Bank, the IMF and the donor community. 
Once funding was granted under the HIPC initiative, a new “National Dialogue” was 
organized in 2000 at municipal level. However, the main consultation was not related 
to defi ning a joint political agenda on poverty reduction, but to the question of whether 
HIPC funds should be transferred to the municipalities or not. As the latter were the 
only stakeholders that were consulted, it was not surprising that it was decided that 
these funds had to go to the municipalities (Dijkstra 2011). 
After concluding the dialogue with the municipalities the responsibility for elaborat-
ing the defi nitive version of the PRSP was shifted to another team of experts that re-
ceived strong and direct support from the World Bank and donors aiming to keep their 
specifi c interests in certain projects considered in the document. This led to de-link al-
most completely the consultation processes with wider sectors of the society – instead, 
the elaboration of the PRSP was based on a format provided by and partially fi lled by 
staff of the World Bank, whose macroeconomic framework was heavily infl uenced by 
IMF and whose specifi c aspects mainly refl ected the priorities of the donor community 
(Dijkstra 2011). This PRSP was approved in 2001 by the World Bank and IMF Boards.
The fi rst PRSP – relabelled the Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy (BPRS) – gives 
a good picture of the state of neoliberal thinking applied to a Third World country 
(Government of Bolivia 2001:1-2): 
•  It was supposedly legitimized through a consultation with “civil society through 
a National Dialogue in order to reach agreement on policy acting in a transpar-
ent and focused framework” (Government of Bolivia 2001:1).2 
•  The BPRS had four components on which the reduction of poverty had to rely: 
1) generation of opportunities, particularly for rural areas and marginal urban 
areas; 2) an increase in capabilities by placing the emphasis on education and 
health; 3) increased security and protection; and 4) the promotion of increased 
participation and integration. 
•  In addition, three crosscutting themes referred to greater participation by indig-
enous peoples and ethnic groups, and gender and environmental topics.
2 Original Spanish texts throughout this paper: translated by the authors for the purposes of this study.
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The aforementioned priorities refl ected an essentially economic epistemology of pov-
erty that is on display in the report’s section on “the main determinants of poverty”. As 
it sets the stage for the whole poverty debate, we cite it in its entirety:
14. Urban poverty is linked to the problems of employment and low human 
capital on the part of workers. On average, 85 percent of urban family 
income is derived from labor. The growth in labor income, particularly 
in the entrepreneurial and semi-entrepreneurial sector which has experi-
enced growth rates around of 5 percent a year, stands in contrast with real 
family sector incomes (through self-employment), which have remained 
virtually stagnant. In the 1990s, the shifts in wage disparity were explained 
mainly by the fact that there was greater demand for skilled labor in more 
advanced sectors of the economy, while those sectors requiring unskilled 
labor saw incomes lag behind.
15. In rural areas, poverty is explained in large measure by the low pro-
ductivity of the farm sector and the low prices that farm products fetch in 
the marketplace. Productivity is affected by the use of small-scale produc-
tion techniques, unskilled labor, water shortages, a lack of basic produc-
tion infrastructure, the high cost of capital, lack of defi nition of ownership 
rights with respect to the land and natural resources, and other factors 
that prevent the optimum utilization of the land. Attention has been drawn 
to the existence of original or native communities (pueblos indígenas orig-
inarios) in the lowlands, who still depend on a subsistence economy based 
on hunting, fi shing and gathering; these populations and other communi-
ties suffer from problems of access to natural resources and low produc-
tive capacity.
16. The lack of road infrastructure results in high transport costs, which in 
turn have an impact on the value of farm products. This hampers the sale 
of goods and prevents small producers from expanding their operations. 
It also gives rise to high transaction costs in sales networks. (Government 
of Bolivia 2001:3-4)
The above citation clearly shows that poverty is understood as an effect of low labor 
productivity, inadequate technologies, working conditions, insecure (private) property 
rights on land and a lack of infrastructure. By putting emphasis on creating favorable 
conditions (through the state) for the development of human, fi nancial and social capi-
tal development orients itself on the ideal of a process that eventually aims at enabling 
private persons and their associations (fi rms) to unfold “freely” within the predefi ned 
modern (capitalist) society. This particular notion of poverty reduction in Bolivia is 
very much in line with the idea of “inclusive liberalism” that identifi es “modern” 
with an ontology underlying the ‘capitalist’ telos (Hickey, 2008). A deeper analysis of 
the special emphasis of the Bolivian PRSP shows that it puts emphasis on promoting 
largely too generic accountability mechanisms criticized by some for ignoring to ana-
lyze the role of extra-national actors (corporations and donors) within particular states, 
and a tendency to overlook the deeper forms of politics that might underpin effective 
accountability mechanisms in developing countries (Hickey and Mohan 2008).
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Regardless of the signifi cant additional funds garnered the approval of the PRSP, po-
litical unrest was steadily growing. When the Banzer government approved a law for 
privatizing state and otherwise collectively owned water rights (in urban and rural 
areas) in 2002, the country entered into a phase of open rebellion by “common people” 
– who increasingly organized themselves in massive social movements. The so-called 
“water war” in the city of Cochabamba forced the government to revert the law for 
privatization and led to a fast process through which the social movements were grad-
ually substituting the central power position of the almost completely delegitimized 
“traditional” political parties on the right and the left. This escalated until the “gas 
war” in 2003, which marked the abrupt end of neoliberal policies in Bolivia (Kohl 
2004).
Three progress reports on the BPRS were produced before 2005. Besides document-
ing progress in terms of the indicators given by the MDG Charter, they confi rmed the 
relevance of the components and priorities of the BPRS drawn up in 2001. 
Although a lot was invested in developing the BPRS and documenting its progress, 
one can conclude that the issue of a Bolivian PRS has never spread beyond the reduced 
community of intermediate-level government technocrats and the relevant administra-
tors in international organizations and the donor community. The issue never became a 
contested issue in the political arena as such, though all actors indeed were concerned 
about poverty as a social phenomenon of high priority. An answer to the question on 
why the BPRS never turned into a real political issue is given by an interesting com-
parative study on PRS in Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua. The study by Dijkstra 
(2011:5130-5131) found that: 
•  PRSPs are written because donors want them to be written, and domes-
tic ownership of the strategies is limited. Participation processes are 
held because the donors want them to be held, but the elected Parlia-
ments are barely involved, the agenda is restricted to technical issues 
and the participation process exercises hardly any actual infl uence.
•  There is a drive among donors to increase budget support relative to 
project aid, but the existence of PRSPs is not necessary or suffi cient. 
Donors and in particular the World Bank engage in ‘business as usual’ 
in their programme loans, implying that they attach many detailed pol-
icy conditions to budget support, making a fool of the ownership idea.
•  All this means that aid effectiveness has not increased as a result of 
PRSPs.
•  This article has also shown that donors are creating virtual realities 
in which planning via PRSPs is dominant, but which bear little resem-
blance to the actual realities in which politics dominate. Recipient gov-
ernments know how to play the game in order to receive donor money, 
but alongside these donor-induced processes the real domestic political 
processes continue.
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•  This donor-induced neglect of politics is not only leading to limited aid 
effectiveness; it is also harmful. The interference of the virtual with the 
actual reality has unintended and often undesired consequences, such 
as a reduced legitimacy of formal laws, a weakening of the domestic 
accountability of government actions, a reduced legitimacy of formally 
elected legislative and executive bodies, the capture of donor money by 
self-interested elites that dominate state power behind a technocratic 
facade, and (in Bolivia) increased political instability.
In the view of the authors of this paper who lived in Bolivia during the described pe-
riod, the fi ndings of Dijkstra’s study exactly describe what happened.
3.2 Post-neoliberal period
With the fourth MDG progress report, elaborated by the new government of Evo Mo-
rales and presented in 2006, a fi rst broader understanding of the MDGs was made 
explicit. 
A fi rst new element was the fact that, for the fi rst time since they were assessed, the 
MDGs are an explicit part of a wider effort by the Bolivian government to evaluate the 
progress of its own national plan of development. This laid the groundwork for con-
textualizing the MDGs within national policies, as well as for adding new elements to 
make them compatible with the national plan of development. 
One expression of this need to contextualize the MDG progress reports was that the 
fourth report, instead of just presenting progress in neutral per capita terms, the report 
for the fi rst time focused on the progress with specifi c attention to the situation of peo-
ple belonging to the 36 ethnic nations in the country (called in Spanish “Pueblos Indí-
genas Originarios”). This was a major breakthrough, because it positively responded 
to a requirement by the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues calling for ethni-
cally differentiated policies and monitoring systems.
The importance of ethnically differentiated data about progress on the MDGs shows 
that there are big gaps for the main indicators between indigenous and non-indigenous 
people. Taking the example of extreme poverty, an overall view shows that between 
1996 and 2006 the average rate of extremely poor people decreased from 41.2% to 
37.7% (Figure 1). However, distinguishing between indigenous and non-indigenous 
people the situation is clearly worse among native people. While 21.3% of non-indig-
enous people were living in extreme poverty in 2006, the share of indigenous people 
living in extreme poverty was about more than twice this rate (48.8%; cf. Ministerio 
de Planifi cación del Desarrollo 2008). Similar gaps also exist for most other MDGs 
indicators (Ministerio de Planifi cación del Desarrollo 2008).
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Figure 1:  Evolution of extreme poverty – differentiating between indigenous and non-indigenous 
people. (Adapted on basis of Ministerio de Planifi cación del Desarrollo 2008) 
Figure 2:  Evolution of moderate poverty  – differentiating between indigenous and non-indigenous 
people. (Adapted on basis of Ministerio de Planifi cación del Desarrollo 2008)
A similar situation can be observed for the case of moderate poverty (Figure 2). Al-
though the gap between indigenous and non-indigenous people is a little less than in 
the case of extreme poverty, it is striking that both social categories are heavily af-
fected by moderate poverty. Moreover, the data suggests that in the fi rst year of the 
new government (being supported by a large majority of the indigenous electorate) 
the share of non-indigenous people living in moderate poverty was starting to decline, 
while the share of indigenous people living in moderate poverty slightly increased. 
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3.2.1 Defi ning indigenous people
Indigenous people are an important category in Bolivia, despite representing about 
62% of the population. However, it is not easy to defi ne what are indigenous people. 
The fourth MDG progress report in 2006 adopted the defi nition widely used in Bolivia 
and in other countries, which is largely based on the UN’s defi nition of indigenous 
people. Although there is no general agreement on the need for a defi nition, there are 
several defi nitions which are widely accepted as guiding principles for the identifi ca-
tion of indigenous peoples, including UN Document A/61/L.67 of 12 September 2007 
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by 
the UN General Assembly on 13 September 2007. The preamble to this document 
makes reference to certain characteristics normally attributed to indigenous peoples, 
such as their distinctiveness, dispossession of lands, territories and natural resources, 
historical and pre-colonial presence in certain territories, cultural and linguistic char-
acteristics, and political and legal marginalization. Similarly, there is no international 
agreement on the defi nition of the term “minorities” or the term “peoples”.
While conducting a special study on the problem of discrimination against indigenous 
peoples, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, José Martinez Cobo (1987), formulated a working defi ni-
tion, that adds more concrete aspects to the one cited above:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that de-
veloped on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sec-
tors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. 
They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined 
to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral ter-
ritories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence 
as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural, social institutions and 
legal systems. 
For the purpose of measuring the MDGs, the above general principles for defi ning 
indigenous people , were refi ned by the government of Bolivia in terms of ethno-
linguist condition (ELC). This defi nition was developed by Molina and Albó (2006) 
and includes (in a fi rst place) people’s self-defi nition, the language one speaks at the 
moment and one’s mother tongue. 
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Table 2:  Population older than 15 years according to answers about self-defi nition, the language one 
speaks and one’s mother tongue for the 2001 census. (Molina and Albó 2006)
Combi-
nation
Belongs to:
Ethno-linguist condition
Population 
over 15
% Categories
Speaks:
Learnt to speak 
in his childhood 
in:
1
Indigenous-
native
Native 
language
Native language 1,774,972 36.2  
2
Indigenous-
native
Native 
language
Spanish/other 
non-native
588,989 12.0 65.8%
3
Indigenous-
native
Spanish/other 
non-native
Native language 23,212 0.5 Indigenous
4
Indigenous-
native
Spanish/other 
non-native
Spanish/other 
non-native
660,012 13.5 3229239
5 None
Native 
language
Native language 182,054 3.7  
6 None
Native 
language
Spanish/other 
non-native
216,063 4.4 34.2%
7 None
Spanish/other 
non-native
Native language 8,475 0.2
Non-indige-
nous
8 None
Spanish/other 
non-native
Spanish/other 
non-native
1,450,384 29.6 1674922
    Total   4,904,161 100.0  
According to this defi nition, 65.8% of the Bolivian population can be considered to 
belong to one of the 36 indigenous nations (cf. Table 2).
In 2008 the Bolivian Government presented the fi fth progress report on the MDGs to 
UNDP. It broadly follows the structure of previous reports, but adds some additional 
elements that aim to show that addressing poverty in terms of neoliberal thinking is 
no longer satisfactory. The main elements that are added to the classical look on pro-
gress are as follows (Unidad de Análisis de Políticas Sociales y Económicas (UDAPE) 
2008): 
1. ... and some reserves of minerals – it was possible to signifi cantly ex-
tend the presence and capacity of the state as a major player in poverty 
reduction. It is pointed out that now, instead of working on the symptoms 
of poverty, the focus of the government is on the structural causes of pov-
erty. In their view, these are expressed in the historic inequality not only of 
access to basic services provided by the state, but also to the structure of 
the state in charge of defi ning and steering the poverty reduction process.
2. The government relates the good progress made on the MDGs to the 
gradual implementation of the “National Plan of Development for a 
Dignifi ed, Sovereign, Productive and Democratic Bolivia that Seeks to 
Live Well” (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo de Bolivia digna, soberana, 
productiva y democrática para vivir bien”) for 2006-2011. The plan has 
four pillars: 
a.  Dignity: Achieving dignity is a structural and individual aim 
addressed by eliminating poverty and inequality by focusing on 
structural causes and the creation of transformative agency.
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b.  Sovereignty: This is the basis for strengthening the state as part 
of a political-societal project and a productive entity that gives 
access to the political and fi nancial capacity for regulating the 
levels of redistribution of resources and the access to them need-
ed to overcome exclusion and inequality.
c.  Democracy: Although the political support of the new govern-
ment is clearly above 50% of electoral votes, the structures of 
state’s institutions and the attitudes of the former non-indigenous 
elite still show manifold signs of colonialism e.g. paternalism, 
bureaucratization, over-fragmentation of deliberative collective 
decision-making. This signifi cantly constrains the move towards 
more direct democratic decision-making.
d.  Linking the whole process of ‘development’ to the concept of “Vi-
vir bien”, i.e. to link the very notion of ‘development’ to a plural-
ity of indigenous or popular visions of ‘development’ or social 
evolution and transformation. Although this aspect is extremely 
novel, the document does not spell out what this really means.
The fi fth progress report clearly aims to establish a more coherent link between the 
national plan for development and monitoring of the MDGs. However, this is not yet 
visible in more practical terms.
The sixth progress report on the MDGs presented in 2010 (Ministerio de Planifi cación 
del Desarrollo del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia 2010) continued to monitor pro-
gress along the same lines as the previous report. One major result was presenting evi-
dence that shows that the effects of the new policies and structural changes continued 
to further reduce extreme and moderate poverty. Additionally, the projections present-
ed for 2015 gave reasonable evidence to suggest that if poverty reduction continues 
at its present pace the goal of reducing extreme and moderate poverty will be more 
than achieved. Unlike previous reports, there is, for the fi rst time, a reversal of former 
trends. While the general reduction in poverty rates was mainly due to people living in 
urban areas, the situation was now reversed: from 2007-2009, the decline of extreme 
poverty was almost twice as high in the countryside (15.8%) as in urban areas (8.9%).
Figure 3:  Evolution of the GINI Index over time. (Ministerio de Planifi cación del Estado 
Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2010: 37) Source UDAPE with data of INE Encuesta de Hogares: (a) = 
per capita household income; (e) = estimated
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As detailed in Chapter 2, there has also been a signifi cant change in the evolution of pov-
erty regarding indigenous and non-indigenous people, as in the GINI Index (Figure 3). 
The data also suggests a reversal of general neoliberal trends according to which high 
rates of growth of GDP are often associated with an increase in, or stagnation of, the 
GINI Index. The report maintains that evidence of the state’s systematic efforts to 
increase its redistributive function is displayed by a relatively rapid decline of inequal-
ity in income distribution, which ran at a comparatively high level between 1996 and 
2005.
3.2.2  From a weak to a strong State – the plan of life for the eradi-
cation of extreme poverty
Responding to the contradictions between the state’s approach to poverty and the in-
dicators and rationale defi ned in the MDGs, in 2009 the government presented the 
Plan of Life for the Eradication of Extreme Poverty (Ministerio de Planifi cación del 
Desarrollo 2009). 
The Plan “Vida para la Erradicación de la Extrema Pobreza” (Life Plan to Eradicate 
Extreme Poverty or PEEP, for its acronym in Spanish) is the offi cial document of the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, and provides information about the poverty situation 
in 2008. Along with statistical data, the report outlines a new approach to tackling 
poverty that emphasizes the idea that poverty can only be eradicated through a radi-
cal transformation of the legal and political structures of the state and its relationship 
with organized civil society. The following four elements are fundamental to such a 
strategy:
•  First, a wider understanding of poverty that goes beyond the notion of a lack of 
income;
•  Second, a strong state with high capacity to generate and redistribute fi nancial 
and political resources is a precondition for establishing adequate interplay be-
tween policy goals defi ned through deliberation, top-down oriented policy im-
plementation under strong and bottom-up driven social control;
•  Third, to consider that the majority sectors of indigenous and “common” peo-
ple – even if they are poor – do have socio-economic, cultural and ecological 
knowledge and capabilities that are expressed in their own forms of political 
organization, which should be further valued and exploited by enhancing rather 
that curtailing policies;
•  Building on socio-economic and ecological potentials also means considering a 
permanent re-orientation of the whole process of social evolution in view of a 
plurality of indigenous and non-indigenous notions of well-being and ‘develop-
ment’ expressed in the diverse forms of “vivir bien” (details see 3.2.6).
This plan, which had the status of a law, was created by, and depends on, the Ministry 
for Development Planning. It has a strategic framework “aimed at helping a greater 
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percentage of the population to vivir bien and aims, in general terms, to eliminate ex-
treme poverty using a comprehensive community management approach.” 
This framework details many specifi c objectives in line with their expected results 
such as the promotion of local growth and development and increasing productivity by 
creating conditions and services to generate income and humane working conditions 
in areas of extreme poverty; ensuring proper food access to cover the nutritional needs 
of families in extreme poverty; and improving the nutrition of communities in extreme 
poverty and increase their income. There are more objectives, all aimed at ensuring 
the comprehensiveness and complementarity of interventions by following people’s 
values and customs through culturally relevant technological innovations.
PEEP’s integral implementation strategies establishes, within the frame of the Politi-
cal Constitution of the State and the principles of the National Plan for Development 
(PND):
•  Strategic and operative alignment (comprehensiveness-concurrence) to gener-
ate development and consolidate the new institutional framework of the policy 
to eradicate poverty;
•  Harmonizing public policies, focused program planning and integration within 
the framework of agreements and strategic alliances;
•  Developing methodologies and instruments for community, inter-sectorial and 
inter-institutional mobilization and articulation;
• Comprehensive community management (based on community values);
•  Articulating the public supply and the local demand based on legitimate 
territorial units of more or less autonomous actors).
Among the components, programs and projects, the fi rst one pertains to nutrition and 
food, like the Juana Azurduy Family Fund Program that helps to reduce child malnu-
trition and mortality (by the direct payment of US$260 to all mothers with children 
under 2 years of age) and the annual payment of US$28.50 to every school child from 
1st to 6th grade (bono Juancito Pinto).
Its economic productive component is based on the concept of vivir bien shared by 
the native indigenous cultures in Bolivia, that is grounded in a cosmocentric vision 
transcending traditional ethnocentric development approaches, that includes inter-
sectorial and inter-institutional articulation processes, integral mobilization and par-
ticipation of communities to reduce climate risks and production shortages, increase 
production and productivity, and individual and community development. 
This includes water, soil, food production, specialized technical assistance services 
and training to improve levels of productivity, in order to perfect productive and com-
mercialization processes. It also involves fair trade prices, community funds to pro-
vide unique initial start-up credits to each family living in extreme poverty.
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It focuses on families through registers based on household surveys that started in 
2011 as a strategy to select groups to apply for the PEEP plan. The organizing crite-
rion is applied in line with four poverty indicators (Unsatisfi ed Basic Needs, Poverty 
Line, Human Development Index)3 at municipal level. In this context, if the refer-
ence according to indicator and municipality tends towards severe extreme poverty. 
This is inferred for the entire municipality population, therefore all families are direct 
benefi ciaries of the PEEP plan. This would allow them to be registered automatically 
into the Benefi ciary Registry. A main component would be active union participation 
(a requirement of the 1953 land reform was that peasant communities had organize 
themselves as “syndicates” of land workers) and native organizations, thus the sur-
vey will be coordinated through the traditional sub-central and Jilankos (traditional 
authorities).4
The plan considers a monitoring and assessment system with four main components: 
poverty measurement and analysis; indicator follow-up and monitoring; evaluation 
of effects and impacts; and dissemination of results. It is important to emphasize the 
effort to monitor the tendency of poverty over time and develop new ways to measure 
poverty with a multidimensional focus, based on the vivir bien approach. The fi rst 
stage of the implementation of the PEEP plan – diagnosis, focalization, indicators and 
goals – will be defi ned using objective poverty measurement methods (LP, UBN). The 
latter stages might include other dimensions, both objective and subjective; thus, “it 
will be possible to have more complete and precise focalization instruments to identify 
the poorest within the conceptual framework of vivir bien”. 
This global plan also considers proposing a Community Plan to Eliminate Poverty 
that includes: a community base line adapted through studies executed with the ben-
efi ciary community for later implementation, including direct transfer or funding, or 
non-monetary donations to communities; donations negotiated and conditioned with 
them to comply with a set of goals to eradicate poverty; developing their capacities, 
abilities and knowledge such as their cultural values; ensuring an effi cient process 
without neglecting their social control mechanisms, complying with their uses and 
customs of the community where the PEEP plays an articulating role. 
During this initial stage, PEEP considers covering 37 municipalities: 12 from Potosi, 
15 from Pando, one from La Paz and one from Santa Cruz, where 716,880 people live 
in conditions of extreme poverty.
To implement this project, in 2008 the World Bank approved a concessionary credit of 
US$380 million (available in 2010) to fi ght poverty in Bolivia, with a 0.75% interest 
rate, a 10-year grace period and a 41-year term, within an overall funding framework 
of $3,000 million for 10 years (Friedman-Rudovsky, 2010).
3 UBN: Unsatisfi ed basic needs is an indicator used in many Latin American countries for measuring 
poverty. It encompasses access to clean water, quality of housing, crowding, education level of house-
hold head, school attendance and other minor aspects.
4 Jilankos: in the Aymara language this is the highest political authority one can hold in a community.
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3.2.3 A broader understanding of poverty
Since poverty is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia proposes to use different defi nitions and measurements of indexes. It under-
stands that the traditional approach to measuring and defi ning poverty is limited, since 
it refers to extreme poverty or absolute poverty as the lack of income necessary to 
satisfy basic nutrition needs. It also criticizes UNDP’s concept, which defi nes general 
poverty or relative poverty as the lack of income necessary to satisfy basic nutritional 
needs and basic needs unrelated to nutrition such as clothing, energy and housing.5
The document states that it is better to consider Amartya Sen’s ideas on the matter. 
The Plurinational State adds therefore that poverty must not be measured only accord-
ing to people’s access to social and material goods. It should also include the people’s 
capacity to use them effectively and to freely achieve their notions of well-being; this 
can vary according to cultural group, political affi liation, sex, location and other fac-
tors. Thus it defi nes human poverty not as being focused on what people lack or do 
not have, but rather on that which people can or cannot do. One way of measuring this 
indirectly is through their access to goods, services and infrastructure (energy, educa-
tion, communications, drinking water) needed to develop basic human capacities. The 
remaining problem would be to determine the type of goods and services that should 
be selected and how each should be weighted. The approach is similar to the method of 
Unsatisfi ed Basic Needs (UBN). It further considers that poverty is aggravated when 
other dimensions are taken into account such as deprivation, social marginalization 
and lack of participation, and access to full, productive and humane working condi-
tions and employment for everyone.
Evo Morales’ plan for poverty foresees a combination of top-down policies to ensure 
stability and economic growth and bottom-up policies nurturing individual capacities, 
improving income distribution and allowing poor people to participate in their quest 
for better living conditions.
3.2.4 Towards a strong state
Bolivia clearly and directly identifi es poverty as a social product that can be eradicated 
by society. The challenge for Bolivia is to change the development model and imple-
ment policies and actions aimed at eliminating extreme poverty, looking for a fair and 
integrated society where all its inhabitants can exercise all their rights and live well.
The government considers corruption and insuffi cient investment in public services 
within rural communities as the causes of poverty in Bolivia. It proposes to solve 
poverty by focusing on empowering rural actors and movements, facilitating fi nancial 
access and supporting more sustainable use of natural resources, or “regional goods” 
(see Chapter xx), addressing problems related with land and water, and strengthening 
poor rural peasant organizations.
5  For international comparisons, the World Bank calculates international poverty lines of 1 and 2 US dollars in terms 
of purchasing power parity (PPP) for 1993 to measure the relative purchasing power of different countries. Absolute 
poverty refers to the situation of people living with under 1 US dollar per day; relative poverty refers to those living 
with less than 2 US dollar per day.
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According to the Vice-President of Bolivia, strengthening the state is a task that is ori-
ented towards changing the relationship between different confl icting political forces, 
a change of fundamental institutional frameworks and the main ideas, discourses and 
symbols (García Linera 2009). The change in the balance of political forces was ex-
pressed by replacing the exclusive circles of politicians, business people, experts, in-
tellectuals and functionaries who were formerly the main actors governing Bolivia, by 
a rather heterogeneous but nevertheless consistent political alliance of rural and urban 
syndicates, neighborhood organizations in urban areas and minor groups of supportive 
professionals and intellectuals. As these social sectors represent social and cultural 
practices that are very different from those of the hitherto dominant group of actors, 
they emphasized the need to recognize institutional diversity. Instead of an essentially 
homogenizing state, indigenous people opted for pluralizing each fundamental institu-
tional domain as varied as the economy (plural economy), the legal framework (legal 
pluralism), education (cultural diversity) and territorial organization (regional autono-
mies). Regarding the relationship between plural institutions and the structure of the 
national state, there is a focus on complementarity rather than competition. In order to 
strengthen the state the areas of ideas, discourses and symbols, the concept that is put 
forward is one of the co-existence of different civilizations – expressed in the Boliv-
ian version as the co-existence of individualist, mercantilist and modernist civiliza-
tion along with several civilizations that are represented through the social, political, 
technological and symbolic practices of the indigenous nations (García Linera 2009).
These three guiding lines for a strengthening of the state found their fi rst expression 
and formalization in the new political constitution of Bolivia that was approved by 
a large majority of the population in 2009. Such a broad-based reconstitution of the 
state within the Bolivian society set the stage for a whole raft of new policies that 
transformed key aspects of the socio-political structures. One key element, which was 
also crucial in poverty reduction terms, was the re-nationalization of Bolivia’s natural 
resources - mainly gas, oil, water, minerals and forests. This made it possible to raise 
state revenues to unprecedented levels, creating the fi nancial basis for poverty reduc-
tion through a combination of policies to improve material and social infrastructure 
while also channeling state revenue to poor and marginalized people through annual 
payments (pensions to old people and vouchers for schoolchildren and pregnant wom-
en). 
3.2.5  Building on the capabilities and knowledge of indigenous 
and “common” people
The government’s plan contrasts with paternalistic programs’ and projects’ view of 
the “rural poor” that ignores the fact that rural people are endowed with immeasurable 
amounts of cultural and intellectual capital that is yet to be exploited. It states that 
cooperation efforts should not be limited to fi nding more markets or to providing tech-
nical help and non-refundable grants, but should rather bring about radical changes 
to production, distribution and power relations within societies, nations and peoples 
based on a respect for peoples’ endogenous knowledge.
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Among the various forms of capital possessed by extremely poor families that are 
expected to multiply the impact of programs to combat poverty are: 1) Their effi cient 
use of resources (they manage to survive with scarce resources, thus, any improve-
ment, however small, catalyses a great impact); 2) Their productive effi ciency (they 
exploit the scarce and seasonal availability of water and provide food for the internal 
market); 3) They are receptive, as they are especially likely to receive and make proper 
use of available facilities (social services, public services or housing). Thus, it is so-
cially highly profi table to provide services to the poorest population. Families living 
in extreme poverty are deemed to stick together well, since they are well-integrated 
communities with mechanisms of social reciprocity and solidarity that are backed up 
by ancestral modes of organization (Ministerio de Planifi cación del Desarrollo 2009)
3.2.6  “Vivir bien” – dealing with plural notions of well-being
Vivir bien is a translation of fundamental notions known in the language of the nation 
of Aymara as “suma kamaña”, in Quechua as “sumaj kausay“, and in Guarani as “ñan-
dereko”. The English translation of the Spanish translation would be something like 
“living well/good living”. It is a concept derived from several of the most important 
indigenous nations in Bolivia and from South America in general. According to Albó 
(2011) it is a cultural concept that is shared – in different forms but with important 
similarities nonetheless - by almost all native indigenous cultures in Bolivia. It means 
having access to, and enjoying, the necessary material goods required for a plentiful 
emotional, intellectual and spiritual life, which strives for harmony with nature and 
prioritizes community living. There are four dimensions to it: access to the spiritual 
goods to live well with what is needed; emotional and spiritual and intellectual realiza-
tion by preserving and nurturing one’s identity, with access to celebration and leisure; 
interculturality without asymmetries of power, since one cannot live well if others do 
not; and doing everything in harmony with the environment.
The indigenous foreign minister David Choquehuanca stated that, on the one hand, 
Living Well is related to democracy, liberty, justice, dignity, development and human 
rights; and on the other, Living Well involves consensus, complementarity, equilibri-
um, identity and cosmic rights, because talk of human rights excludes Mother Nature. 
He also stated that the native indigenous conception of Living Well coincides neither 
with capitalism, where the main thing is money, nor with socialism, where humans are 
the most important element (Choquehuanca 2010).
The originally rather cultural notion of vivir bien had to be transformed into a politi-
cal concept because the majority of Bolivians decided to use it as the foundation of 
the new political constitution approved in 2009. The need to orient societal evolution 
toward the principle of vivir bien is expressed as the overall guiding principle in the 
preamble to the constitution, as well as serving as a basic guideline for the economy 
and the education system.
By placing emphasis on the integrality and transversality of live that is expressed as a 
continuum and embraces society, nature, cosmos, past, presence and future, the notion 
of vivir bien clearly transcends classical categories of policymaking, which tend to ad-
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dress these aspects by fi rst conceptually separating them and then carving out targeted 
policies for each sector. This means that vivir bien now has to be translated into public 
policies, programs and projects - and a corresponding system of public administration. 
The diversity of possible linguistic interpretations should be acknowledged, such as 
“Living Well” together, which is specifi cally oriented toward communities, and “Liv-
ing Fully” with all society’s means to express a new form of development based on 
intermediate positions and living together that is linked to modernity. Thus the current 
process of change and the accompanying democratic and cultural revolution expresses 
this paradigm. Furthermore, there are other more radical visions attached to indig-
enousness and ancestrality that are not marginalized and have therefore to be taken 
into account.
A fi rst concrete expression of this orientation is the approval of the 2010 Mother Earth 
Law, which is understood as a fundamental law (Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional 
de Bolivia 2010a). It is a law that seeks to defi ne and recognize the rights of Mother 
Earth – understood as a living being – and regulates how human society has to behave 
in order to establish a satisfactory relationship with nature. The law enunciates as a 
basic principle that the relationships between human society and Mother Earth have to 
be completely reshaped to strive for harmony, prioritize collective over private goods, 
guarantee the regeneration of Mother Earth, avoid treating nature as a mere commod-
ity and respect interculturality. The law further defi nes the duties of the state and its 
people in the realization of these principles and defi nes the constitution of the legal 
entity responsible for overseeing the correct implementation of the law.
At fi rst glance, one might conclude that vivir bien and the rights of Mother Earth have 
little to do with an analysis of how the MDGs are addressed in Bolivia. However, as 
we will show in the next chapter, it is precisely the dialectical relationship between 
a constitutionalized version of vivir bien and Mother Earth on the one hand and the 
need to generate material and fi nancial profi t and progress on the other that became the 
focus for debates, tension and confl ict between groups of actors within and outside the 
political alliances that are currently dominant and back the government. 
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4 Debates 
In this chapter we summarize the main ongoing debates. We try to focus on aspects 
directly related to poverty, although as the history of approaches to poverty above 
clearly showed, this is only possible for the neoliberal period. During the post-neo-
liberal period, poverty has ceased to be the concern of well-paid and generally non-
indigenous technocrats from national and international organizations. Poverty turned 
out to be a starting point for a quest to identify and cure its many-faceted, structural 
root causes. Poverty was not seen any longer as a failure of “modern” liberal, capitalist 
society, but as its logical consequence.
4.1  Has poverty really been reduced over the past six 
years of change and how? 
There is permanent debate about whether poverty has really been reduced in recent 
years and, if so, to what degree this can be attributed to the policies of the new govern-
ment. Initially, the effectiveness of Evo Morales’ new policies was mainly disputed by 
the shrunken political opposition, largely made up of the former socio-economic elites 
of large land-owners and the private sector. They were generally not directly involved 
in questioning these aspects, but as they also have close connections to mainstream 
mass media (press, TV, radio) and many civil society groups opposed to the present 
government, they can count on numerous groups of experts and political activists who 
seek to identify weaknesses in the dominant political movements and government 
policies. 
However, as the quality of their information is often not well sustained and based more 
on fairly generic philosophical principles about how a liberal society should func-
tion, their readings of current political tendencies have not really managed to sway 
large sectors of Bolivian society. A good example of this kind of initiative is the NGO 
Prisma’s weekly journal “Nueva Cronica y Buen Gobierno”. Their journalists regu-
larly declare that the government’s economic policies offer no answers to the goals 
and needs of poor people and that the slow progress shows how diffi cult it is to change 
the still largely colonial structure of the state (Grossmann 2011). There are frequent, 
generalizing allusions of the type that can be made about the ongoing process regard-
ing its achievements and shortcomings. The only conclusion that such articles present 
is that the “whole endeavor is failing”, although they provide no concrete evidence to 
back this up. 
The chorus of criticism of economic policies became louder when a group of marginal-
ized or retired intellectuals and development experts who had served as offi cials and 
ministers in the new government published a manifesto in 20116 campaigned for the 
6  Original text see: www.somossur.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=707:documento-por-la-
recuperacion-del-proceso-de-cambio&catid=82:los-movimientos-sociales-en-tiempos-de-evo&Itemid=104.
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process of change in Bolivia to be reviewed. Based on unconvincing and partial data, 
they came to the conclusion that the process of change had got stuck and that it must 
be revived through a broad domestic debate that extended beyond the dominant power 
structures of the government alliance.
The reaction of the government to this criticism from conservative former civil serv-
ants consisted of providing detailed information about the effectiveness of their poli-
cies. This had the positive effect of making the debate far more coherent and sta-
tistically based, leading to the conclusion that although the effects could have been 
greater, the current set of policies has indeed helped to reduce poverty signifi cantly 
(see the data presented in the following sections).
In order to respond to criticism that “almost nothing has really changed”, the informa-
tion was presented in such a way that it gives a feel of the ongoing debates about such 
data. This involves presenting and interpreting the changing data “before” and “after” 
neoliberal policies, which is identical to “before” and “after” the arrival in power of 
the “Movement towards Socialism” (MAS in Spanish) as the political instrument of a 
heterogeneous group of indigenous and social movements. 
In 2006, when Evo Morales and the social movements started to govern, 60.6% of the 
population lived on less than two USD/day (moderate poverty) and 38.2% lived on 
less than one US dollar/day (extreme poverty). In urban areas 24.3% of the population 
lived in extreme poverty, while in rural areas 62,9% of the people were living on less 
than one US dollar/day (see Table 1, p. 9).
Table 3:  Extreme and moderate poverty at national level and in urban and rural areas. 
(García Linera 2011a:15)
DETAIL 2000 2005 2010(e)
MODERATE POVERTY      
National      
Percentage (%) 66.4 60.6 49.6
Thousands of people 5,638 5,708 5,166
Urban      
Percentage (%) 54.5 51.5 41.7
Thousands of people 2,837 3,091 2,886
Rural      
Percentage (%) 87.0 77.6 65.1
Thousands of people 2,801 2,616 2,280
EXTREME POVERTY      
National      
Percentage (%) 45.2 38.2 25.4
Thousands of people 3,869 3592 2,637
Urban      
Percentage (%) 27.9 24.3 15.5
Thousands of people 1,455 1,471 1,071
Rural      
Percentage (%) 75.0 62.9 44.7
Thousands of people 2,415 2,121 1,566
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According to Table 3, between 2005 and 2010 the new government reduced moderate 
poverty from 60.6% to 49.6% and extreme poverty from 38.2% to 25.4% (at national 
level). Moderate poverty in urban areas decreased from 51.5% to 41.7%, and from 
77.6% to 65.1% in rural areas. Extreme poverty decreased in rural areas from 24.3% 
to 15.5% and in rural areas from 62.9% to 44.7%. 
In other words, between 2005 and 2010 about 1 million people passed from the con-
dition of being “poor” to being persons with a “medium income” (Programa de las 
Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) 2011).
Figure 4:  Ratio of income of poorest 10% of people to income of richest 10% in Bolivia. 
(García Linera 2011:17)
This had a positive effect not only in terms of poverty reduction, but also in relation 
to differences of income between the richest and poorest population strata. In 2005 
the richest 10% of people earned 128 times more than the poorest 10%, which ranked 
Bolivia among the most unequal societies on Earth. By 2009 the difference between 
the poorest and richest 10% had fallen to 60 (Figure 4).
The signifi cant progress made regarding poverty reduction since 2005 is the result of 
a concerted effort to restore the state’s position as a major player that doesn’t only in-
tervene in legal matters, but also to control an economically and politically signifi cant 
share of GDP. The major momentum for this was provided by the Bolivian govern-
ment’s nationalization of gas and oil reserves in 2006. Its control of GDP rose from 
17% in 2005 to 34% in 2009. 
Greater control of GDP has allowed the government to signifi cantly increase the redis-
tribution of national income from the better-off part of the private sector to the poor ma-
jority. The redistribution mechanism is through direct payments to children (in basic 
school age), pregnant women, and men and women over 65 years. These “bonos” in-
creased the direct redistribution of GDP from 0.5% in 2001 to 1.6% in 2010 (Figure 5).
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Figure 5:  Direct transfer to schoolchildren, old people and pregnant women in US dollars (millions) 
and as a % of GDP. (García Linera 2011:19) (e) Estimated, (1) Bonosol period 2001-2007. 
Source: Implementing Unit BIP, AP and Implementing Unit Bonus Juana Azurduy 
Besides direct payments, the state’s increased control of a signifi cant part of GDP also 
led to an increase in fi nancial transfers from the central state to regional (departments) 
and local (municipal) levels (Figure 6). 
Figure 6:  Transfer of fi nancial resources from central to departmental and municipal authorities in 
millions of Bolivianos. (García Linera 2011:21).
The reappearance of the state, after 20 years of its being sapped by neoliberal policies, 
was only possible by increasing its capacity to invest directly in strategically important 
sectors and through state-controlled companies.
Total public investment increased fi vefold between 2001 and 2011 (Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Evolution of public investment, 2001-2011. (García Linera 2011:21)
Regarding the fi scal situation, the new policy of strengthening the state did not lead 
to a worsening of the situation compared to the supposedly more favorable conditions 
created by neoliberal policies. On the contrary; for the fi rst time since 1950, from 
2006 onwards national accounting reported no fi scal defi cit, but rather a fi scal surplus 
(Figure 8).
Figure 8: Fiscal situation of public sector, 1950-2010. (García Linera 2011:85)
At the end of 2009, the worst global recession for decades, the economy of a small and 
controversial country like Bolivia was complimented by the IMF for its “fi rm macro-
economic management and an effective political response to mitigate the impact of the 
global crisis”, where “it experienced one of the highest growths in Latin America and 
has signifi cantly decreased its infl ation”. Friedman-Rudovsky (Friedman-Rudovsky 
2010) said the country possessed a solid fi scal policy, a favorable attitude to some 
reforms and fl exibility when managing the fl uctuating currency exchange within a 
defi ned scope.
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This allowed the country to maintain relatively high rates of growth and translate this 
into a signifi cant increase in income per capita, which is especially high if compared 
with the situation of the neoliberal period (cf. Figure 9).
Figure 9:  Evolution of income per capita with clear boost since 2006. (Source: Ministry of the Presi-
dency, 2010.)
It is important to note that the aforementioned positive evolution is not the result of 
opening the national to the global economy through liberalization, but through an ex-
plicit strengthening of the state’s capacity to intervene directly in the national economy 
(through direct public investment) or through imposing social justice measures on the 
private sector. The degree to which the state has been strengthened as an economic 
player can be illustrated by income generated by tax and other contributions (Figure 10).
The 2006 nationalization of hydrocarbon reserves forced oil companies inside the 
country to renegotiate their terms with the government, increasing the state’s share of 
profi ts many times over. Between 2004 and 2008, the state’s income was US$3,500 
million, increasing its per capita collection from US$58 to US$401. This explains the 
huge increase of fi scal income over the last six years to its current level of 20% of 
GNP. The government decided to save a large part of these resources, since in 2008 its 
international reserves constituted 41% of GNP; currently, they are close to US$10,000 
million, or about 50% of GNP (García Linera 2011a).
It is also thought that “when the crisis set in, the government had already implement-
ed a timely public works program, sustained it and introduced additional resources 
to stimulate the economy.”7 6% of GNP was devoted to infrastructure development, 
public works, consumer bonds and other investments in 2008. In 2009 expenditure 
increased to 10.1% of GNP. Another macroeconomic decision that worked well, ac-
cording to certain analysts, was sustaining a hybrid fl uctuating currency exchange rate 
band system consisting of a fi xed exchange rate constantly readjusted even without 
7  Gonzalo Chávez, researcher in verbal communication at the Catholic University of La Paz.
 2010 (personal communication).
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public knowledge. The government worked to increase confi dence in the Bolivian 
currency and managed to convince economic agents to “bolivianize” their fi nancial 
assets, thus partially de-dollarizing transactions. 
Figure 10:  Evolution of the state’s income, with a clear boost since 2006. (Source: Ministry of the 
Presidency, 2010.)
Infl ation increased in March 2008, but the government resisted pressure to reduce 
growth on the grounds that it was due to an external shock caused by rising energy 
prices. According to Friedman-Rudovsky, the government’s move paid off because 
infl ation reached only 0.8% and the GNP debt ratio decreased from 84% in 2003 to 
37% in 2010. Furthermore, in spite of the impact on the informal sectors, most ana-
lysts agree that the economy is on the right tracks. “Controlled infl ation, fi scal surplus, 
moderate growth. In spite of President Morales’ discourse, the country seems to be fol-
lowing the guidelines established by the IMF, the World Bank and other institutions”8. 
On the other hand, a congressman from the opposition stated: “The true reason of our 
growth is not the boom in raw materials. Let’s think of the country as an airplane. It 
used to have only one motor – exporting raw materials – and we would have crashed 
when those prices decreased. Now we have another motor: domestic demand. That’s 
the secret.” It is not easy to create an internal market with a poverty index above 60%, 
where half the population live in extreme poverty. However, the internal demand is 
increasing at an annual rate of 6%, well above the 2% and 3% rates before Evo Mo-
rales was elected president. However, Minister Arce emphasizes fi nancial and banking 
trends. In 2006 savings amounted to US$360 million dollars, most in long term fi xed 
rate accounts and 20% in saving accounts. In 2010, 36% of the deposits were in sav-
ings accounts. He said, “This shows people possess a surplus to save and there is trust 
in our banks.”
On the other hand, according to CEDLA, the Centre for Labour and Agrarian Studies: 
“Bolivia is one of the countries with greatest inequality in the region, where the richest 
population (20%) appropriates 58.5% of total income; by contrast, the poorest sectors 
access 3.7% of income. This is due to the varying degrees of worker qualifi cations and 
the sector they work in. In spite of some advances, women in our country are still mar-
8  Gonzalo Chávez, researcher in verbal communication at the Catholic University of La Paz. 
2010 (personal communication).
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ginalized and discriminated in a labor market that prefers men” (Rojas Callejas 2009)
4.2  Developmentalism and the rights of Mother Earth: 
clash or dialectical relation?
The approach of the Bolivian government to view declining poverty rates as an indica-
tor of progress of deep structural change is shared by the population and almost every 
civil society organization, including the depleted center-right political parties. Dissent 
does not concern this approach as such, but rather its implementation and the requisite 
setting of priorities that are the most typical policymaking dilemmas.
The dilemma that has turned into a permanent source of dissent is the government’s 
aggressive promotion of economic growth as the main driver for strengthening the 
state’s position as a direct player (not only regulator) and as a precondition for its 
redistributive function. This apparently contradicts the principle of vivir bien and the 
rights of Mother Earth, known in indigenous languages as Pachamama.
The objective contradictions and tensions between what people conceptualize as de-
velopmentalism and Pachamamism turned into a major fi eld of politics in which al-
most all relevant societal actors compete to impose their specifi c visions, priorities and 
connections between two opposing poles (development and Pachamama). 
Although these positions diverge radically, unfolding a policy arena that covers most 
of the fundamental poles of the human/nature dilemma, as part of the political agenda 
it confi gures and allows a common – though controversial – political arena and “play-
ground” that did not exist before. The resulting struggles express themselves in con-
stant deliberation and mobilization by different social, indigenous and environmental 
movements that support or challenge the course the government is charting through 
the dilemma of developmentalism and Pachamamism. 
Moments in which these struggles become most visible are the resistance against so-
called mega development projects, e.g. the building of a national road through a large 
protected area called the TIPNIS Park, the corresponding construction of bridges, or 
the construction of medium-sized dams to convert the country’s energy production 
from exclusively non-renewable to renewable sources (hydropower). The different 
positions of the actors involved in these confl icts and their debates can be easily situ-
ated on a scale from developmentalism to Pachamamism. While most political organi-
zations related to the government consider development as the material and fi nancial 
precondition for achieving the goals they associate with vivir bien, incorporating the 
rights of Mother Earth into the generation of material and fi nancial wealth incremen-
tally, many opposing organizations argue that development is the cause of growing 
denial of the rights of Mother Earth and hence that vivir bien can only be achieved by 
forgetting the classical notions of development and putting the environment fi rst. 
A fundamentally new feature of these debates is that anyone wanting to articulate his 
position aims to do so with or through indigenous social movements. Nowadays, even 
the formerly powerful environmentalist and conservationist NGOs of the political 
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groups that search to articulate new basis for opposing Evo Morale’s government are 
aiming to create alliances with indigenous groups that can then support the claims of 
their civil society allies. A more detailed account of these new networks can be found 
for the case of TIPNIS Park in Frantz (2011). 
Frantz (2010) points out that an important feature of the confl ict is not the often cited 
clash of indigenous/Pachamamist against developmentalist/governmental points of 
view, yet it would be “erroneous and essentialist to assume that all indigenous peoples, 
including those opposed to the TIPNIS highway, are inherently ‘pure’ and committed 
to human rights or environmental preservation.”
However, the government fi ercely contests Frantz‘s argument about the assumption 
that many indigenous organizations support the political movement associated with 
the government of Evo Morales, and yet remain critical and thus work to improve 
the very movement. Bolivia’s Vice-President, a renowned intellectual and sociolo-
gist, penned an incendiary riposte. In a recent publication entitled “NGOism, infantile 
sickness of the right - or how the “recondition” of the process of change is neoliberal 
restoration” (García Linera 2011a) he aims to reveal that behind the mobilization of 
parts of indigenous organizations against the national road in the TIPNIS Park are to 
be found mainly (though not exclusively) former political backers of the neoliberal 
style of government. This style was based on an alliance of international donors fund-
ing national NGOs as part of governmental policies, and these NGOs thus became a 
key player in the development of rural areas. How this worked out in practice in the 
Bolivian highlands is shown in a critical scientifi c article that argues that “redefi ni-
tion of indigenous identities includes the representation and validation of subjects and 
actors within transnational discourses cohering neoliberalism and multiculturalism” 
(Andolina et al. 2005:678). 
Through the Vice-President, the government assumes the right of the Bolivian society 
to maintain a metabolic exchange with nature that accepts that both sides have spe-
cifi c needs for their reproduction, and that these must be satisfi ed in an interdependent 
way. Paraphrasing Marx’s economic and philosophic manuscripts (Marx 1988[1844]), 
the government states that achieving the goal of interdependent reproduction means 
“humanizing nature and naturalizing human beings”. Consequently, the government 
is not against the recognition of the rights of Mother Earth, but sees the challenge 
of “development/vivir bien” as constructing metabolic relations between society and 
nature based on dialogical/dialectical? interaction of the two points of view. The gov-
ernment therefore focuses on addressing the tension between developmentalism and 
Pachamamism not as part of a debate for or against the present government, but as an 
inherent contradiction of the process of change in Bolivia, which must, however, avoid 
that these inherent contradictions are instrumentalized by political actors that want to 
set-back structural change to the times before 2005. 
Garcia Linera (2011b) in another recent text paints a broader canvas of this and other 
debates about the contradictions of the government’s current policies by pointing to 
the fact that the emerging contradiction between developmentalism and Pachamamism 
must be understood as part of a set of basic contradictions that are inherent to the pro-
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cess of change in Bolivia. These are tensions related to the questions on how to strike a 
balance between 1) the principles of governance of the national state and diverse forms 
of governance of diverse social movements, 2) the hegemonic fl exibility without giv-
ing up the social core of the present political confi guration, 3) the interests of the com-
mon public good, with private and particular interests, and 4) the idea of socialism and 
notions of communitarian notions of vivir bien (García Linera 2011b). The process 
through which these inherent tensions must be resolved in his view is clearly not by 
confronting two types of mutually exclusive models of society, but as part of dialecti-
cal internal process that constantly reconfi gures the relationships between the societal 
core of the process of change – which is also in constant evolution – with the relation 
it develops with the surrounding external political and natural/ecological conditions. 
Regardless of one’s stance, the fact that these debates are played out through shifting 
alliances of non-indigenous civil society with indigenous organizations (which make 
up 64% of the population) are an interesting indicator and demonstrate that in terms 
of political representation, Bolivia succeeded in radically changing the respective role 
and importance of previous majority and marginalized groups in society.
4.3 Debates among intellectuals
There are clearly two active groups in the intellectual sphere in Bolivia. A fi rst group 
of intellectuals focuses on the perceived negative aspects of the present process of 
radical transformation. They have a rather ambiguous position that consists of criticiz-
ing the government – compared with its discourse - for not implementing “truly” left-
wing or anti-capitalist policies. But they do not claim that they themselves would - or 
the government should - carry out more coherent “left-wing” policies. A good example 
is a recent book on capitalism in Bolivia, “The Dilemmas of Development” (Molina 
and Oporto 2011), in which the authors aim to provide a better understanding of the 
root causes of “our underdevelopment”. It also seeks to demonstrate how the stuck 
dynamics of capitalism favored by the lack of any serious development policy (by the 
present government) is not allowing the Bolivian process of change to benefi t from the 
successful visions guiding the transformation of neighboring countries such as Brazil, 
Peru or Paraguay. However, in order to understand what this really means, we suggest 
that it is an important Bprocess that is much more fundamental than the more social-
democratic approaches of Brazil or Paraguay (Sader 2008).
The other groups are intellectuals who are closely linked to the dominant social move-
ments and the current government apparatus. One renowned representative is the Vice 
President Alvaro Gracia Linera who, together with his group of intellectuals (the co-
muna group) from La Paz, has published numerous books and other publications both 
before and since Evo Morales’ election. They claim to conceptualize the emerging 
experiences within the sphere of power not from a purely academic point of view, but 
as a means of constructively analyzing the forces, dynamics and actors underlying 
the everyday process of change. A good example of this is a book that conceptualizes 
the process of change since 2005 in terms of “The State as a Field of Struggle” be-
tween hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces and actors written by four intellectu-
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als closely associated with the comuna group (Garcia Linera et al. 2010). It is obvious 
that their point of view starts from the process of change and aims to understand how 
it is confi gured and to learn how it can be better directed. 
Regarding research on behalf of the international scientifi c communities, a lot of work 
has been done on systematizing the factors and actors involved in pushing forward a 
rapid and deep structural transformation in Bolivia (Kohl, 2004, Lupien 2011). An-
other strand of research focuses on the constraints that the process of transformation 
might face when different theoretical orientations are taken as a reference. The notion 
of ‘governmentality’ (in a Foucauldian sense) has become rather frequent. One exam-
ple is Androlina et al.’s (2005) research on recent political change in the highlands 
of Bolivia in which they argue that “redefi nition of indigenous identities includes the 
representation and validation of subjects and actors within transnational discourses 
cohering neoliberalism and multiculturalism. As indigenous movement platforms and 
concepts become increasingly embedded in offi cial agencies and policy frameworks, 
their demands for culturally appropriate government and development are in practice 
implemented as governmentally and developmentally appropriate culture” (ibid, 678). 
The authors conclude, however, that the observed overlap between indigeneity and 
neoliberalism is limited and has not been able to get rid of a non-capitalist tradition 
that was always present too and that indigenous identities and agendas could be con-
structed in order to oppose neoliberalism and state-driven decentralization. Taking ac-
count of these works, we support the conclusion of Sebebart (2008:187) that “complex 
interactions between governmental and non-governmental actors on all levels, from 
local to global, turn policy-making into cumbersome and slow negotiation processes, 
but at the same time provide unprecedented opportunities to initiate development pro-
cesses in line with social, economic, environmental and cultural sustainability.”
4.4  The stony path from theory and normative 
principles to practice
Another constant debate refers to the ways in which the goals of poverty reduction 
– which indeed require an ingredient of material development and economic growth 
– should be balanced with the somehow confl icting principles of vivir bien and the 
rights of Mother Earth. Unfortunately, the discussion about such fundamental issues 
has become part of a superfi cial political debate that is mainly promoted through com-
mercial newspapers, radio and TV stations that are traditionally aligned to center-right 
politics. Nowadays they are clearly offering public media space for any kind of politi-
cal opposition to the present government. Clear signs are the astonishing support that 
such media are currently (May 2012) giving to the radical left-wing confederation of 
trade unions Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) who struggles to increase the minimum 
wage from presently 1000 to 8000 Bolivianos per month. A further example of this is 
the exclusive space these media offer to some indigenous groups from the lowlands, 
which, with strong support from some radical conservationist NGOs and right-wing 
political groups from the Santa Cruz elites, are fi ghting against the construction of a 
road through the Indigenous Territory and National Park Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS). 
Drawing attention to this situation does not deny the need for discussions about salary 
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increases or road and infrastructure construction in the common or national interest. 
It intends only to make clear that the commercial media instead of promoting a fair 
debate about complex and controversial issues – which do indeed need discussing – 
is preventing this by unilaterally manipulating the issues for political capital and to 
distract from the really important issues. Instead of acknowledging that both aspects 
– development, poverty reduction and the rights of Mother Earth and related ideas of 
vivir bien - are fundamental parts of the new political constitution, the political debate 
becomes abstract. This reduces the arguments to fruitless discussions about whether 
the government’s entire political project is failing, e.g. due to the construction of a 
road or due to not over-increasing the minimum wage to the average salary of a profes-
sional with a PhD working for an international company.
As a result, there is almost no debate about the potential and limitations of the wide range 
of current transformations, e.g. related to new laws on decentralization, autonomous 
powers, legal pluralism, interculturality and public administration, struggles against cor-
ruption, reform of the juridical system as a whole, or the linkages of macro with micro 
economic policies, environmental protection, infrastructure development, etc.
In the following section, we shall illustrate and assess how the government intends to 
chart a course through the confl icting needs of the Mother Earth Law and rural devel-
opment. The fi eld of rural development is a top priority for the new government and 
yet the proportion of people living in extreme and relative poverty is highest in rural 
areas and cannot only be improved by more effective agrarian development policies.
The main instrument for reshaping rural development according to the new constitu-
tion is Law No. 144 on the “Productive, Communitarian and Agricultural and Live-
stock Revolution” (Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional de Bolivia 2010b). The law 
aims to guarantee food sovereignty as a major goal by establishing institutional, politi-
cal, technical, fi nancial and trade-related measures that take account of the diversity 
of economic actors, the co-existence of diverse forms of economies (economic plu-
ralism), credits and the rights of Mother Earth. The main target groups of the law are 
the huge number of indigenous economic organizations. While these actors have been 
greatly empowered politically through the decentralization, the re-territorialization of 
indigenous nations’ autonomous powers and the considerable increase in the powers 
devolved and fi nancial resources granted compared to previous governments, their 
productive situation has not improved accordingly. This is the entry point through 
which this law aims to translate general change into rural development. 
The main instruments provided by the law are therefore the recognition of indigenous 
economic organizations and associations as formal partners in the design, execution 
and monitoring of the activities that are supposed to guide their “productive, commu-
nitarian and agricultural and livestock revolution”. A total of 16 specifi c policy lines 
cover aspects ranging from the organizational strengthening of economic actors, in-
crease in productivity through research, technical innovation, fair trade and fair price 
mechanisms, agricultural assurance, prevention and management of risks, protection 
and conservation of natural resources in the long run, guaranteeing provision of high-
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quality food in suffi cient quantities, considering central government’s and indigenous 
nations’ shared responsibility towards the whole population of the plurinational state 
and the rights of Mother Earth. 
Each specifi c policy line expresses a compromise between three basic values that refer 
simultaneously to the need for increased economic productivity and fi nancial income 
of labor invested in food production, doing this in accordance with the cultural prefer-
ences and socio-productive wisdom and practices of the different indigenous nations 
and other local populations, and the need to protect the rights of Mother Earth in the 
long term.
The principle of shared responsibility is expressed in some articles that focus more 
on the responsibilities and rights of the communities, while other sections emphasize 
those of the state. A common feature of both these foci is that they aim to specify the 
needs of “development” and “Mother Earth” by differentiating between their specifi c 
responsibilities. A case for the fi rst focus is Article 13 that refers to the strengthening 
of the productive base. The text prescribes that “the productive base has to be strength-
ened through emphasis on local and ancestral practices of the communities used for 
integrative management that optimizes the use and access to water for irrigation, in 
view of watershed requirements and that protects the water for life, recuperates soil 
fertility through the reposition of vegetation cover, use of organic fertilizers, terraces 
and the conservation and increase of biodiversity through the recuperation and cul-
tivation of native seeds and the use of improved seeds and other actions that protect 
the biodiversity against bio-piracy and transnational private companies’ tendency to 
monopolize seeds”. The general principle of Article 13 is further specifi ed for the main 
natural resources, pointing out the need for:
1)  Integrated soil management that considers ancestral and new knowledge, tech-
nologies and communitarian forms of production that are compatible with the 
natural potential of land and soil types, including a gradual replacement of min-
eral fertilizers and pesticides;
2)  Integrated water management, based on increased irrigation infrastructure that 
stresses communitarian or other forms of self-administration and the needs of 
water of related ecosystems;
3)  Integrated management of seeds and genetic resources, based on communitarian 
in-situ and public ex-situ conservation, in order to maintain and increase genetic 
variety as a major resource for agricultural production. 
Article 19 refers to trade and commercialization and summarizes specifi c responsi-
bilities of the state, which must ensure that production, commercialization and trade 
contribute to maintaining food sovereignty “based on the principles of reciprocity, 
complementarity, and a redistribution of agricultural products with the aim of serving 
human society rather than just the market”. More concretely, this means establishing 
the state’s active role in the regulation (based on agreement with the productive sec-
tors) of the type and volumes of food produced, ensuring that exportation and impor-
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tation are not hampering the establishment of markets for domestic production and 
consumption. One fundamental instrument in this regard is the establishment of state-
owned marketing boards (public marketing companies) and community-based storage 
facilities (called according to the Inca traditions “Pirwas” and defi ned in Article 17).
In order to operationalize the population’s right to co-determine the rural development 
policies, the law foresees the constitution of “economic-productive committees” in 
which the governing bodies of indigenous and other local and national peasant and 
farmer organizations represent the population against the state at municipal, provin-
cial, departmental and national level. 
Against the background of the heated public debates propagated in the urban mass me-
dia about the “illusionists’ aspiration” to establish the rights of Mother Earth and the 
principles of vivir bien as parts of national development policies, this law turns out to 
be quite rational and surprisingly consistent with the more progressive and culturally 
sensitive notions of “sustainability”, at least considering the principles, contents and 
measures of the law summarized above. 
Although there has been little time to evaluate a law that has only been in existence 
for a year, the involvement of the authors of this paper in some major related projects9 
allows us to highlight some critical points that should be debated if we are to create a 
space to accompany - and where necessary criticize – the implementation of this (and 
other) policies in a constructive fashion.
Our experience shows that the main challenge so far is not the impossibility of trans-
lating the principles of “development”, vivir bien and the rights of Mother Earth en-
shrined in the constitution into balanced laws and regulations. The challenge is instead 
related to the different speeds at which the (fast-moving) legal framework is changing 
and the process of internalizing the changing values, attitudes, skills, knowledge and 
new forms of organizations required for implementing the new norms, which is a 
rather slow process. This means that the different patterns of action and behavior that 
social actor categories need to be able to express starts to emerge as a critical factor in 
the whole process of change. 
A clear sign of this aspect in relation to the law on “Productive, Communitarian and 
Agricultural and Livestock Revolution” discussed above is Evo Morales’ inaugura-
tion speech10 at the 15th General Assembly of the powerful Peasant Federation of 
the Department of Cochabamba, in which he reminded the peasants to start forming 
the “economic-productive committees”, which, although not yet in place are making 
it diffi cult to better negotiate and coordinate top-down and bottom-up policies, which 
should converge in a jointly managed dynamic of change.  
9 Both authors are part of the monitoring unit of the national program „BioCultura“ which is a pilot 
program aiming at promoting rural development based on the simultaneous promotion of cultural 
and biological diversity carried out by the Vice-ministry of Environment, Biodiversity, and Climate 
Change fi nanced by SDC (http://biocultura-ume.org/). Through the cooperation agreement of the 
CDE/University of Berne and AGRUCO/University Mayor de San Simon (UMSS) Stephan Rist is 
involved in various training courses for peasant leaders and professionals of the public administration 
and Bolivian policy makers involved in making operational this and other laws. 
10 Speech given at 11 May 2012 transmitted live through Television Boliviana (TVB).
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5 Conclusions
The Plurinational State of Bolivia has decided to try to achieve the MDGS through a 
much wider political framework as part of fundamental changes to the social contract 
of the actors in Bolivian society. Achieving the MDGs is not a goal in itself, but an in-
dicator that shows the progress and failures of the process of structural change promot-
ed by the government and its associated social, indigenous and popular movements.
A center-piece of this broad societal strategy was the formulation of “Life Plan to 
Eradicate Extreme Poverty” (PEEP in its Spanish acronym). It stated that 6 million 
of the 10 million Bolivians were poor in 2006; 3.7 million of them lived in extreme 
poverty, mainly in rural areas and overwhelmingly native indigenous peoples, women, 
children and elderly people. 
The government plan acknowledges that families living in extreme poverty have po-
tential that can multiply the impact of programs and extend effi ciently them to the 
rest of society, since they survive on scarce resources. Thus any slight improvement 
in their income is a catalyst for large-scale impact. Furthermore, these people dem-
onstrate a high level of mutual supportand constitute integrated communities in rural 
areas and well-organized neighborhoods in the cities. 
The plan involves specifi c transfer payments (bonos, vouchers) to the most vulner-
able groups – elderly people, mothers, infants, and children who have left school. The 
productive economic component based on vivir bien includes water and soil, food 
production, specialized technical assistance services and training to improve produc-
tivity, fair trade and community funds to provide start-up and non-refundable grants. 
The plan deems it necessary to promote new poverty measurements with a multidi-
mensional approach based on Living Well that also includes a Community Plan to 
Eradicate Poverty with a community baseline. 
According to the last MDG progress report from 2010 (cf. Chapter 3.2), one major 
result is to have provided evidence that the effects of the new policies and structural 
change are continuing to further reduce extreme and moderate poverty. Additionally, 
the projections presented for 2015 give reasonable evidence that if poverty reduction 
continues at its present pace, the goal of reducing extreme and moderate poverty will 
be more than achieved. In contrast to former reports, there is, for the fi rst time, a rever-
sal of former trends. While the general reduction in poverty rates was mainly due to 
people living in urban areas, the situation has now turned around. From 2007-2009 the 
decline in extreme poverty is almost twice as high (15.8%) as in urban areas (8.9%). 
The main debates and confl icts do not directly concern the present and future of the 
MDGs. Such debates remained - both before 2005 and after Evo Morales’ election - 
limited to a small circle of formerly well-paid technocrats from national government 
and international organizations. Present debates, however, are addressing the achieve-
ments, constraints and contradictions of the overall process of structural transforma-
tion, rather than simply focusing on its outcomes for MDG-related poverty indicators.
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The process of change is based on a comprehensive transformation of Bolivia, in 
which basically four highly contested political fi elds are emerging. They are related to 
the need to recombine in a new way: 1) the principles of state governance and diverse 
forms of governance of diverse social movements; 2) hegemonic fl exibility without 
ceding the social core of the present political confi guration; 3) the interests of the com-
mon public good, with private and particular interests; and 4) the idea of socialism and 
communitarian notions of vivir bien.
These political arenas are sources of permanent tension arising from the dilemmas 
they represent. However, it was the government’s agenda to open up this controversial 
area of political debate and dissent and to search for agreement by emphasizing dis-
cussion about the aggressive promotion of economic growth – as for the main way to 
strengthen the state ‘s role as a direct player (not only regulator) and as a precondition 
for its redistributive function – and on the other hand the establishment of apparently 
contradicting principles of vivir bien and the rights of Mother Earth or Pachamama.
The objective contradictions and tensions between what people conceptualize as de-
velopmentalism and Pachamamism became a dominant fi eld of politics, in which al-
most all relevant societal actors are struggling to impose their specifi c visions, priori-
ties and links between the opposing poles of development and Pachamama. 
Although the positions diverge radically, the unfolding of a policy arena as part of the 
political agenda confi gures a common – and indeed controversial – political arena that 
establishes a common “playground” that did not exist before. The resulting struggles 
express themselves in the constant deliberation and mobilization of different social, 
indigenous and environmental movements that support or challenge the course they 
are charting through the dilemma of developmentalism or Pachamamism.
Differences are also apparent in the conceptions that serve as the backdrop to Living 
Well, as well as in the position social actors occupy. Previously, poverty was a cen-
tral part of national strategy and was often used to promote the government’s public 
image and as a communications strategy to reduce poverty. This is in contrast to the 
current context, where it is no longer at the center of leaders’ preoccupations or their 
strategies, though it is often talked about. It is a paradox that previously, when those 
in positions of power were not poor, poverty was much talked about; and now that the 
poor are in the government, this topic is not a priority. 
This does not mean that the issue of poverty and inequality is not important. Though 
the government has a counter-hegemonic perspective that opposes the centuries-old 
western capitalist approach, it is time to deploy the true dimension of cosmovisions of 
life based on indigeneity and ancestrality that challenge almost every plane of life and 
propose alternative future paths. This, of course, includes matters such as growth, the 
economy, distribution, development, society and also poverty, its conceptualization 
and its treatment. These will be the lens through which the set of variables at stake 
will be seen between now and 2015 and beyond. The culture of poverty is a colonial 
legacy, not an indigenous one, since Andean societies are full of potential, capacities 
and possibilities for generating wealth, particularly based on processes of decoloniza-
tion and different paradigms. 
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The present study is part of the Working Paper Series for the Special Research 
Project on “Poverty-oriented development policy beyond the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals”.
With 2015 fast approaching, a sense of disenchantment is growing in some circles as 
many working towards the high-profi le Millennium Development Goals realise how 
far out of reach they remain. Disillusionment is already giving way to critical refl ec-
tion, however, and the contours of a new critical discourse on global poverty and 
development are beginning to emerge. Many have begun questioning implicit norms 
and assumptions that underpin the MDGs. Critics see the fi rst goal in particular – “to 
reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day” – as subtly 
re-enforcing a mainstream view of poverty couched in ideals of global capitalism and 
market growth.
An NCCR North-South working group is examining the emerging critical debates, 
which are likely to shape development policy and interventions for years to come. The 
working group is seeking to generate an overview of the debates within a range of spe-
cifi c countries, i.e. India, Nepal, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Costa Rica, Bolivia, 
and Switzerland. The overviews will defi ne core dimensions that characterise these 
debates, and critically assess them in light of NCCR North-South research fi ndings. 
This will help formulate recommendations for a post-2015 development agenda based 
on differentiated experiences and understandings – globally and locally – of poverty, 
poverty alleviation, and well-being. Please follow the project at http://www. north-
south.unibe.ch/content.php/page/id/320 
The present Working Paper by Stephan Rist and José Nuñez del Prado provides the 
working group with an overview of related debates at global level. Responsibility for 
its content rests with the author.
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Between 1986 and 2005 Bolivia went through a tough phase 
characterized by the successful implementation of neolibe-
ral policies. Resisting this, indigenous people – representing 
about 64% of the population – started to reorganize themsel-
ves beyond the classical system of representative democracy, 
which was almost completely dominated by white and mesti-
zo elites; these indigenous people developed indigenous and 
popular social movements aiming at a new “social contract” 
and expressed the need for a new constitution for Bolivia. 
Their main strategy was direct political action, based on mar-
ches, demonstrations, road blockages, hunger strikes, and 
huge mass mobilizations, which fi nally led to a democratic 
“system change” in 2005, when Evo Morales was elected as 
the fi rst indigenous president in Bolivian history. This was 
consolidated by a radical new political constitution, based on 
the concept of a plurinational state that stipulates recognition 
and autonomy of the 36 indigenous nations in Bolivia within 
the territorial context of the present state, and is based on the 
co-existence and co-governance of indigenous nations and 
the structures of the existing state. 
With the transition from an essentially neoliberal to a radically 
new societal setting, the role and understanding of the MDGs 
and related polices changed as well. This paper presents what 
we can learn from these changes for future debates about the 
MDGs in Bolivia.
